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Abstract  
 
Following the Arab spring, Arabs today are passing through a dangerous time of tough and 
difficult choices that bear far-reaching consequences. This paper argues that there was a 
significant economic element to the Arab Spring, which relies mainly on the Arab economies’ 
failure to achieve sustained inclusive growth. The purpose of the study is to understand whether 
the economic growth of the region has been unsatisfactory due to Arab economies lagging in 
terms of reforms, or because of the reform programs themselves. 
In this paper, the empirical model analyses the linkages between economic reforms, human 
capital, physical infrastructure, and governance and growth for a panel of 87 countries, 
including 20 from the Arab region over the period 1995 to 2014. The analysis finds that 
macroeconomic and external stability are primary variables for the reform development and 
the growth prospects of the developing countries. The efficiency of structural reforms depends 
on success in stabilising the economy. The most striking result from the baseline model is that 
the coefficient of governance is significant and positively determines growth in the whole 
sample, while it is harmful in Arab sample. Additionally, the result tends to show that the 
resource curse in the Arab region is largely an “institutional curse”, even though it has several 
macroeconomic manifestations. 
The conclusion of the study confirms that reform is simultaneously political, social and 
economic. Economic reform should not be seen in a vacuum, in isolation from the political and 
social choices that society makes. 
Keywords: economic reform, Arab Spring, governance, panel analysis, North Africa 
and the Middle East 
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1. Background 
 
  Arab countries (ACs) are a diverse set regarding size, geography, level of income, natural 
resource endowments, economic structure, human capital and skills, social structures, 
economic policies, and institutions. Their land surface areas are 44% larger than China or 3.8 
times the size of the European Union, and hold half of the world’s known oil reserves and its 
natural gas (BP 2014).  Therefore, the oil sector has provided the basis for economic and social 
development throughout the region, not only for oil-producing economies but for resource-
poor Arab economies as well, through remittances, trade, capital and aid flows.  The region has 
also been linked to economic policy, with similar models of economic development adopted 
by ACs since the 1950s and 1960s, based upon state-led planning with strong social policies 
designed for redistribution and equity (Bibi and Nabli 2010).   
 Different themes have shaped the characteristics of socioeconomic reform after independence. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the development model in ACs was based on strong governments, 
central planning of economic and social priorities, and wide-scale policies for redistribution 
and equity. During the 1970s-oil boom, ACs especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries launched ambitious programs of public spending on infrastructure and services. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, this progress faced pressures for change because of the 
significant role played by oil revenues. In the 1990s and 2000s, many ACs launched economic 
reform programs prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
These reforms mainly were concerned with structural adjustment policies, macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural reforms (Abbott et al. 2010). 
 Despite implementing all these reforms, they did not significantly affect the standards of 
living of Arab citizens. Indeed, over the last fifteen years or so, growth performance of the 
Arab region as a whole has been disappointing. According to Makdisi et al. (2006), the 
economic growth pattern is  inextricably linked to several characteristics of most of the 
economies in the region notably, their heavy dependence on oil, weak economic base, high 
population growth and unemployment rates, low rates of returns on investment in physical and 
human capital, low level of integration in the world economy, and underdevelopment of 
market institutions. 
A significant constraint to growth is the lack of adequate infrastructure, an exception being the 
Gulf countries. Following the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments, almost half of 
the private businesses in the region complain that infrastructure is moderate to a significant 
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obstacle to conducting business. Telecommunications and transportation, two necessary 
services, are also significantly underdeveloped (Nabli 2007). 
 Furthermore, across the region, the lack of improvement in labour markets and living 
conditions are another critical constraint on growth. Unemployment is one of the primary 
sources of economic failure in most Arab countries. According to the Arab Labour 
Organization (ALO) in 2007, the overall average unemployment rate for the ACs was about 
14.4 percent of the labour force compared to 6.3 percent for the world at large (Utz and Aubert 
2013). A cross-country study of developing countries including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Jordan found that the first three of these countries have significant gaps relative to other 
developing countries with regard not only to youth employment but also the quantity and 
quality of education and skills mismatches (EBRD 2015; Jelassi et al. 2015). Of the seven Arab 
countries assessed in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, five scored 
worst in the labour market efficiency category in 2014 – 15, and three of these countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia) have been in the bottom decile of rankings of labour market 
efficiency for the previous three years (World Bank 2016b). 
 Owing to the nature of the educational system, there is a strong presence of large public sectors 
which distort incentives, in addition to excessive regulations negatively affecting private sector 
expansion. The countries in the region continue to fail to use human capital efficiently.  
Pissarides and Véganzonès (2006), argued that education systems in the region are more 
aligned to the needs of the public sector, with the result that acquired skills do not match those 
required in growth-enhancing activities in the private sector. Excessive regulation of the private 
sector and a highly controlled labour market, have further removed the incentives for 
employers to recruit, train and retain productive workers. 
 Moreover, a report by UNDP (2011), which examined the sectoral economic growth and long-
term structural transformation in the region, found that heavy sectoral weights of extractive 
industries lead to dependence on global oil prices. The structure of production limits 
employment generation for skilled and semi-skilled labour. Low-skilled services and informal 
activities absorb the labour force and have adverse effects on aggregate productivity and living 
standards. The slow emergence of manufacturing capacities distinguishes the economies of the 
Arab region from other developing countries, such as those in Asia. 
 Economists in recent years have come to a broad consensus that economic performance is not 
always warranted by economic characteristics alone, but it is often shaped by the political and 
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institutional environment in which economic activities take place (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008). 
Regarding the Arab region, besides the poor economic conditions, there are weak governance 
and institutional framework. Regardless of the different approaches used by institutional and 
commercial agencies, they all conclude that ACs are poor in all these indicators including the 
governance aspects in general and especially in democracy (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Marshall et 
al. 2012; PRS Group 2011). 
 According to the Freedom House (2015), the region as a whole had the worst civil liberties 
scores of any region, and most of its countries classified as partly free or not free. Arab nations 
are among the worst performers in estimates of global corruption perceptions index (CPI) 
(Transparency International 2011).  They also observed that corruption is the primary challenge 
in the region, with three of the bottom ten countries CPIs in 2014 coming from the region. 
 High-level corruption is exemplified by the ruling elites who control both the polity and key 
segments of the economy. They abuse formal and informal institutions to control the 
accumulation and distribution of resources and jobs to extend their power and amass illicit 
wealth. Corruption was indeed an instrument for the capture of the economy. Despite the 
process of transition to a  liberal economy as happened in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, 
the elite’s power and hold over resources expanded during these periods of “economic 
liberalisation”. For instance, privatisation and public procurement operations carefully 
managed to ensure that close associates of the rulers would control these assets. This has led to 
an entrenched rent-seeking system of crony capitalism (Kaufmann and Fellow 2011). 
There is no doubt that these political and economic institutional conditions had reflected 
directly on economic performance and business activities. Emara and Jhonsa (2011) and Nabli 
(2007) have argued that the low efficiency of capital in the MENA region can be attributed to 
the fact that most countries in the region provide an unfriendly business environment and 
insufficient institutional support for private investment.  Makdisi et al. (2006) have also 
highlighted the importance of the quality of institutions in explaining the low productivity 
performance of MENA countries in comparison with the rest of the world in general. 
Furthermore, Aysan et al. (2007) addressed the issue of the low level of private investment in 
the region, with the empirical results showing that governance plays a significant role in private 
investment decisions. The same result exists in the case of "administrative quality" in the form 
of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, the investment-friendly profile of administration, 
law and order, as well as for "political stability." The estimations also stress that structural 
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reforms like financial development and human development affect private investment 
decisions directly, through their positive effect on governance. 
In the light of the above, the ACs regarding polity is characterised by a top-down, personalised, 
highly concentrated, and non-contestable mode of governing. Economically, the region 
exhibited highly skewed income and wealth accumulation as well as resource allocation, and 
distribution of political power linked with a highly centralised power of the ruling elite. In 
particular, under this politically and economically captured system, neither the middle nor the 
poor class were beneficiaries. 
Under this dark image of living conditions, a broad wave of protests spread throughout most 
of the Arab region popularly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. The Arab street seemed to have 
made clear that it is no longer willing to accept these development models and the control and 
distribution of the region’s resources. A primary goal of the protesters everywhere from Tunisia 
to Bahrain was easy to capture from major slogans of the demonstrators in the Arab world. The 
first one was, "The people want to overthrow the regime" and the second “Bread, freedom and 
social justice”. These slogans represented what Arab people have suffered from, especially 
during the last two decades. They aim to create more participatory and representative political 
systems, a fairer economic system, and independent judiciaries (Alimi et al. 2016). 
Regarding the first slogan, Tunisians succeeded in overthrowing their president, and so did the 
Egyptians, the Libyans, and the Yemenis (Hissouf 2014), while the second one which 
underlines the interdependence of inclusive governance, economic and social inclusion, still 
requires more time to achieve it. It needs more strategic thinking towards exploring alternative 
solutions and a range of development policy options to help redress the underlying causes that 
gave rise to the widespread popular grievances and discontent. 
To further understand the origins of and find solutions to the Arab Spring, this paper aims to 
investigate why Arab economies have failed to achieve sustained inclusive growth. In order to 
address this question, the study evaluates the impact of socioeconomic reforms on economic 
performance, through estimating an economic growth model for the Arab Region in 
comparison to other regions in the world with an emphasis on the role of governance.    
In other words, the research attempts to understand the possible explanations: whether the 
growth performance of the region has been disappointing because ACs economies have lagged 
behind in terms of reforms, or due to the reform programs themselves lacking key components 
such as governance and quality of institutions? 
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section is a brief overview of the 
theoretical model, while section three presents the empirical model and estimation approach.  
Section four presents the aggregated indicators of economic reforms, human capital, physical 
infrastructure, and governance and summarises the progress of these indicators in the Arab 
region. Section five discusses the estimated results of the growth model that includes the 
different composite indicators, with the last section focusing on conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
2. The Methodology 
   2.1 The Empirical Model 
The setup of the empirical model is primarily driven by the Solow-Swan growth model with 
the estimation approach following “Barro-type regression” (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). As 
mentioned, the primary aim of the model is to measure the economic reform effort of the 
countries by estimating a conditional convergence equation for economic growth. The 
aggregated economic reform indicators are generated using principal component analysis 
(PCA). This novel approach allows the computation and categorisation of environmental 
variables identified by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) into six separate groups. 
The first component is macroeconomic stability reform indicator (M) incorporating 
exchange rate (M1), the deficit (M2), public debt (M3), inflation (M4), and unemployment 
(M5). The second is external stability reform indicator (E) which contains current account 
balance (E1), the ratio of external debt to exports (E2), total reserves in months of imports (E3), 
and diversification index (E4). Thirdly, the component of structural and business reform (B) 
consists of foreign direct investment (B1), domestic credit to the private sector (B2), and the 
concentration index (B3). Fourthly, the component of human capital indicator (H), which 
includes health expenditure (H1), school enrolment (H2), life expectancy (H3), and scientific 
articles published (H4). The fifth component is physical infrastructure indicator (P), 
consisting of fixed telephone subscriptions (P1), improved water source (P2), access to 
electricity for population (P3), and improved sanitation facilities (P4). Lastly, the governance 
indicator (G) is based on voice and accountability (G1), political stability (G2), government 
effectiveness (G3), regulatory quality (G4), the rule of law (G5) and control of corruption (G6).  
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In addition, to controlling for sample heterogeneity and consistent with the literature, other two 
control variables are examined. These variables reflect differences in endowment levels of 
natural and human resources, which can be at the origin of significant differences in the “natural 
propensity” to grow. The evolving demographic situation is controlled for through the 
incorporation of annual population growth rate (POPi,t). Given the significance of the natural 
resource sector to many of the African countries; the ratio of oil rent to GDP (oili,t) variable 
has also been included in the model. This hypothesis is supported by the figures, as shown by 
the value of the Hausman test as presented in the next section (see Table 3). 
Real GDP per capita growth is therefore empirically expressed as follows:  
𝒍𝒏(𝒀𝒊,𝒕) =  𝜶𝟎  +  𝝋𝟏𝒍𝒏(𝒀𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ) +  𝜽𝟏(𝑴𝒊,𝒕) + 𝜽𝟐(𝑬𝒊,𝒕) + 𝜽𝟑(𝑩𝒊,𝒕) + 𝜽𝟒(𝑷𝒊,𝒕) +
                     𝜽𝟓(𝑯𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟔(𝑮𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟕(𝒐𝒊𝒍𝒊,𝒕 ) + 𝜽𝟖(𝑷𝑶𝑷𝒊,𝒕 ) +   𝜺𝒊,𝒕               (𝟏)                                        
where, 𝒀𝒊,𝒕 represents the economic growth rate in country i at time t; ln (𝒀𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) is an N x 1 
vector of logs of initial GDP; Mi,t. macroeconomic stability indicator;  Ei,t, external stability 
indicator;  Bi,t, structural and business reform indicator; Pi,t, physical infrastructures indicator; 
Hi,t,  human capital indicator; Gi,t, governance indicator; POPi,t, population growth rate; oili,t,the 
ratio of oil rent to GDP; α0  is the intercept, θ1 to θ8 are parameters for convergence and the 
principle components, i,t denote country and time period respectively, and εi,t  is the error term. 
2.2 Description of the Data 
The empirical model as in equation (1) presents ten explanatory variables; six of which are 
principal components with 24 sub-variables and four control variables. The empirical analysis 
examines the trends and directions of the indicators, as well as the correlations between them 
and then, applies a panel data econometrics to estimate the economic growth functions for the 
respective group of countries.  The study draws upon multiple sources for annual time-series 
data on a host of economic, social, political, and institutional indicators for 76 countries from 
7 different regions based on the availability of data and representativeness of all continents. As 
Figure 1 shows, amongst these countries, 17 are Arab countries (ARB), 6 are Central & South 
Asian countries (CSA), 9 are East Asian countries (EAS), 25 are European countries (ECS), 
10 are Latin America countries (LCN), 2 are North American (NAC), and 9 are 7 Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries (SSF). 
In addition following World Bank (2006),  the study classified Arab countries into four 
subgroups according to their natural-resource wealth, labour abundance and level of income. 
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The first group is “resource-poor, labour-abundant (RPLA)” or emerging economies (Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza).  Second, “resource-rich labour-
abundant (RRLA)” or transition economies (Algeria, Iraq, and Syria), and the third group 
“resource-rich labour-importing (RRLI)” economies (the rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Libya).  Finally, “low-
Income Countries (LICs)” (Sudan and Yemen)3. 
Figure 1: The Distribution of Countries in the Study Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data sources for the analysis include the following: 
i. World Development Indicators (WDI): provides data for infant mortality rate, health 
expenditure, education school enrollment, public spending on education, government 
expenditure on education, road network logistics performance index, telephone network 
fixed telephone subscriptions and improved water source (World Bank 2015).  
 
ii. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) CountryData provides data for GDP, inflation, 
deficit, exchange rate, unemployment, public debt, external debt, and current account 
balance (EIU 2015). 
 
iii.  The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) captures six key dimensions 
of governance since 1996.  These are voice and accountability, political stability and lack 
of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control 
of corruption (World Bank 2014). 
                                               
3 See Appendices 1, 2, and 3 for the list of countries. 
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2.3 Estimation Approaches 
Panel data methods are the preferred approaches for pooled cross-country and time series data 
((Durlauf and Quah 1999) since panel data methods provide more information, more efficiency 
and less multi-collinearity (Baltagi 2008; Baltagi and Kao 2000). Panel estimates provide 
higher degrees of freedom, are more informative, and biases are substantially smaller than 
cross-sectional estimates.  
One of the most significant challenges faced in panel data estimation is how to deal with 
heterogeneity characteristics in the dataset. Barbieri (2006) has however noted that the 
development of heterogeneous panel unit root and panel cointegration tests have greatly 
enhanced empirical analysis using panel data. 
Therefore, the estimation approach involves three stages: Firstly, panel unit-root test is 
estimated based on Levin -Lin-Chu (LLC) test (2002), Im et al. (2003), Fisher type tests 
(Maddala and Wu 1999) and (Choi 2002) to ensure the variables are integrated of the same 
order. Secondly, panel co-integration technique based on Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999) is 
applied to check whether there is a long-run co-integrating relationship among the variables. 
The analysis is especially interested in the group statistics which take into account 
heterogeneity. Thirdly, the estimation tests the relevance of unobservable individual effects 
through Lagrange Multiplier and Hausman tests.    
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Descriptive Analysis of Aggregated Indicators of Economic Reforms, Human Capital, 
Physical Infrastructure and Governance 
 ACs differ considerably among themselves, as well as with the rest of the world, especially 
regarding economic reforms, physical infrastructure, human capital and governance. These 
differences have been assessed using various indicators that have been aggregated using 
principal component analysis. This method has been used to generate six aggregate indicators.4 
                                               
4 As part of the empirical work, the study attempted, without success, to introduce into PCA the 
cumulative privatization receipts and stock market index as a factor in the structural reforms. Other 
interesting indicators had to be ignored because of limited and reliable data. This was the case with 
public health and education expenditures, the density of road network, and net international liquidity in 
terms of months of import cover, which could have reinforced the external stability index. Similarly, 
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This section briefly presents a summary of the six composite indicators which were created to 
support the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.  
3.1.1 Macroeconomic Stability Indicators (M) 
 Macroeconomic stability denotes precise factors that lead to a stable and robust environment 
in which individuals and companies can reliably engage in transactions.  In terms of 
macroeconomic stability, the GDP needs to increase at a reasonable pace each year.  Such 
increases allow a country’s citizens to enjoy a stable or better standard of living. 
Figure 2: Macroeconomic Instability Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014) 
A. Regions       B. Arab subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
The reform of macroeconomic stability indicator estimated as an inverted indicator, therefore, 
low and negative values represent an improvement in the reform, while large and positive 
values indicate bad macroeconomic stability conditions. As shown in Figure 2, macroeconomic 
stability gradually declines over 1995 – 2014 in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America 
regions, while North America, Eastern Asia, and Europe regions experienced high progress in 
macroeconomic stability.  
For Arab region, there were some progressive improvements during the period 2000 - 2010, 
however, the macroeconomic stability collapse in 2011 following the civil wars and political 
instability in the region. For the 4 subgroups of ACs, the analysis shows that LICs, RPLA and 
RRLA, have not achieved the required macroeconomic reform, while RRLI experienced 
                                               
the structural reform index could not benefit from information on mean tariff rates, or highest marginal 
individual and corporate taxes. 
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significant improvements. Remarkably, the indicator declined for all sub-Arab groups in the 
last period (Figure 2B).  
 
3.1.2 External Stability Indicators (E) 
External stability is defined as a desirable situation where an economy is living within its 
means, and able to pay its commitments in its international transactions, without the burden of 
these overseas payments causing severe problems that could reduce living standards. External 
stability can refer to the key components that keep nations economically secure in relation to 
the rest of the world. Instability can increase uncertainty, discourage investment, impede 
economic growth, and hurt living standards. 
Figure 3: External Stability Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014) 
A. Region      B. Arab subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
Remarkably as in Figure 3, there are three main clusters can be distinguished in this regard: 
The East Asia region has experienced very high progress in external stability with average 0.90. 
The second cluster with mild stability in the Central Asia region, the Arab region, and transition 
economies in East Europe with an average 0.11, which slightly higher than the world average 
-0.04. The third cluster with highest rates of instability during the whole period for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin American regions with average -0.80 and -0.17 respectively. For Arabian 
nations, all oil exporting countries except Iraq in (RRLI and RRLA) have robust external 
stability mainly due to the oil boom between 2002 to mid-2008, which generated a large 
volume of revenues more than doubled their average compared with the preceding five years. 
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The abundant revenues were instrumental in boosting all foreign stability components 
especially current account balance and international reserves 
3.1.3 Business and Structural Reform (B) 
A government's main objective for structural reforms is to promote competition, enhance the 
services sector, move up the value chain in manufacturing, and achieve stronger integration at 
the regional and international levels. Ambitious structural reforms can boost economic growth. 
Structural and market reform is quantified based on a wide range of indicators that take into 
consideration trade policies, the business environment, the quality and improvement of the 
business environment. 
 
Figure 4: Business and Structural Reform Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014) 
                A. Region                                                                                      B. Arab subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
Although the structure and market reform indicators witnessed a gradual increase from 1995 
until 2010, it remained steady from this point till 2014. This was a result of the fall in FDI to 
the Arab region after the political uprisings, especially in the RPLA countries, Egypt and 
Tunisia. In general, ACs seemed to perform relatively good compared to other developing 
regions in the world both at the general level and the specific 4 group’s classification level.  
3.1.4: Human Capital indicators (H) 
According to Savvides and Stengos (2008), the human capital endowment can be a more 
important determinant of its long-term economic success than virtually any other resource. This 
resource must be invested in and leveraged efficiently for it to generate returns, for the 
individuals involved as well as an economy as a whole. Recent empirical investigations of the 
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contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth have confirmed the need for 
improving health and education of the general populace to ensure sustainable growth and 
economic development. It is argued that the developing world has to prioritise this effort on an 
urgent basis (Alvi and Ahmed 2014). 
Figure 5: Human Capital Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014) 
A. Region  B. Arab subgroups 
  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
Although the human capital indicator in the Arab region improved slightly throughout the 
period, it can be considered as the third worst in the world after Africa and Central Asia (Figure 
5). It is obvious that large gaps still exist between ACs and the developed world in terms of 
human capital. Analysing the infant mortality and school enrolment indicators showed 
remarkable good performance starting from 2010 for all Arab sub-groups except RRLA (due 
to the civil wars), this means there is potential for significant improvements in health and 
education in the region. 
3.1.5 Physical Infrastructure Indicators 
Physical infrastructure refers to the basic physical structures required for an economy to 
function and survive, such as electricity generation, transportation, telecommunication, and 
water and sanitation. The impact of infrastructure on long-run economic growth has been 
studied extensively. The underlying theoretical framework of the impact of public capital on 
economic growth was developed first by Arrow and Kurz (1970). Based on this framework, 
the endogenous growth literature shows that an increase in the stock of public capital can raise 
the steady-state growth rate of output per capita, with permanent growth effects (Barro 1990, 
1992). 
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 A majority of the literature finds a positive impact on the relationship between infrastructure 
and economic output (Loayza and Odawara 2010). The complementarities between physical 
infrastructure and physical and human capital lead to higher productivity and increase the 
incentive to invest (Aschauer 1989; Calderón and Servén 2004; Seethepalli et al. 2008). 
Figure 6: Physical Infrastructure Indicator by Region (1995 – 2014) 
A. Region  B. Arab subgroups 
  
 
  Source: Authors’ own calculations 
As shown in Figure 6, despite limited progress throughout the period, ACs status in 
infrastructures has remained insufficient. Access to healthy water has slightly improved, but 
about 50% of the low-income countries population in the Arab world still face difficulties in 
accessing improved water. Closing the gap with more advanced developing countries 
constitutes a significant challenge for ACs. 
3.1.6 Governance and Institutions Indicator 
In recent decades, a surge of interest in governance has been seen as a means to promote 
economic development.  Governance matters have been an integral part of societies since the 
dawn of civilisation, and especially so concerning what values, ethics and rules of conduct and 
justice should be upheld, how societies should be organised, and who should hold power and 
authority.  
Economists currently have dedicated increasing attention to the impacts of political institutions 
and issues of governance in the process of economic development. The burgeoning literature 
on the topic has indicated a broad consensus in that economic performance is not always 
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warranted by economic characteristics alone, but it is often shaped by the political and 
institutional environment in which economic activities take place (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008). 
Additionally, in their analysis of some OECD countries during the period 1980 to 2000, Adam 
et al. (2007) prove that the quality of governance is more essential than the socioeconomic 
environment in affecting government spending efficiency. Furthermore, the findings of these 
studies show that states that are efficient in their government spending are characterised by 
citizen-friendly regulatory environments and strong transparency, regulatory practices, cost-
effectiveness, and public spending directly associated with policy purposes.  
Figure 7:   Governance and Institutions Indicator by Regions (1995 – 2014) 
A. Region  B. Arab subgroups 
  
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 8:   Governance and Institutions Indicator - Means 
A. World Regions and Arab subgroups B. Arab subgroups and Arab countries 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Following from Figure 7 and 8, North America, Europe and East Asia rank very highly 
regarding the quality of governance. The Arab region is not only below the global average and 
the third worst region behind Africa and Central Asia, but also the only region with a gradual 
decrease in the governance indicator.  On average, overall governance in the ACs is low, and 
evidence shows that there have been virtually no good governance performers in the region.  
3.1.7 GDP per capita growth 
Despite the noticeable progress in various areas of reform, ACs growth performance has shown 
disappointing results.  Almost all ACs are growing slowly, but for different reasons. The Arab 
region has the worst economic growth in terms of the progress of GDP per capita. The regional 
GDP growth stayed at around 2 percent from 1995 to 2010 (Figure 9 and 10), which was lower 
than the rest of the world regions. 
 Although some ACs called Arab reformers launched economic reform programs prescribed 
by the IMF and the World Bank such as all countries in (RPLA) group, it can be seen that 
nothing appears exceptional about the performance of these countries. Their GDP growth rates 
are about the same as the others. These reformers countries’ simple average GDP and per capita 
income growth rates consistently equal the growth rates of the entire region. This observation 
reinforces the argument that the growth experienced in the region is coming from elsewhere. 
Specifically, it comes from oil exports and oil revenues. 
Following the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, economic growth tumbled and turned negative; 
an already poor development suffered yet another setback. However, ACs before the transitions 
in 2011, they were lagging behind other emerging market and developing countries, and there 
was a perceived lack of competition in domestic markets. 
Figure 9:   GDP per Capita Growth Rates (%) by regions (1995 – 2015) 
A. Region       B. Arab subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
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Figure 10: Percentage GDP per Capita Growth plot by time and by regions 
 
                       Source: Authors’ own calculations 
3.2 The Effect of New Aggregate Indicators on Economic Growth  
As discussed in the methodology section, the estimation approach follows four main steps: 
panel unit-root tests, panel cointegration tests, assessment of the significant of unobservable 
individual effects tests, and empirical estimations of the model as presented in equations (1). 
 3.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests: 
Prior to testing the existence of a long-run cointegrating equilibrium among the variables, the 
integration properties of each panel have to be examined, since an incorrect transformation of 
the data may lead to spurious results. 
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests for Variables in Level (Intercept is included) 
Tests  Levin, Lin & 
Chu (LLC) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(IPS) 
Fisher Final 
result Variables 
 
ADF PP 
Ly 
-16.64600 
(0.000) 
-15.7851 
(0.000) 
543.333 
(0.000) 
901.186 
(0.000) 
I(0) 
M 
-3.73479 
(0.001) 
-2.66146 
(0.0039) 
192.463 
(0.0031) 
202.142 
(0.0007) 
I(0) 
E 
-7.77880 
(0.000) 
-3.19758 
(0.007) 
187.146 
(0.002) 
225.811 
(0.000) 
I(0) 
B 
-7.33402 
(0.0000) 
0.32819 
(0.6286) 
143.240 
(0.5022) 
147.889 
(0.3950) 
I(1) 
H 
-1.695 
(0.0450) 
3.70912 
(0.9999) 
116.428 
(0.9086) 
138.574 
(0.4703) 
I(1) 
P 
-8.28406 
(0.0000) 
1.10117 
(0. 8646) 
225.629 
(0.000) 
504.369 
(0.000) 
I(0) 
G 
-8.5056 
(0.0000) 
-3.526 
(0. 0002) 
240.525 
(0.0000) 
253.355 
(0.000) 
I(0) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using EViews and STATA.  
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Note: Values in parentheses refer to the probability of the test statistics. The null hypothesis of Levin, 
Lin & Chu t-test assumes common unit root process, while the others assume individual unit root 
process.    
The results of panel unit root tests in Table 1 are based on four-panel unit root tests for all 
variables in levels and first differences namely, LLC, IPS, Fisher (ADF) and Fisher 
(PP)(Breitung and Pesaran 2005; Gengenbach et al. 2006; Im et al. 2003). Apart from some 
limited exceptions, panel unit root test statistics significantly confirm that all the series have 
not a panel unit root in level, except for business reform (B) series, and human capital (H) 
series are stationary variables in first difference, I (1) variables. First differencing can remove 
non-stationarity as it appears from these two variables. Hence, the co-integration tests can be 
examined with intercept only to avoid the potential stationarity of the dependent variable with 
the trend. 
3.2.2 Panel Co-Integration Tests 
Two different tests of cointegration are performed to explore the co-movement among the 
variables in the model: the Kao and Pedroni tests of cointegration, taking into consideration 
the results of the panel unit root tests. Three tests of Pedroni (panel v, panel rho, and group rho) 
indicate that there is no co-integration among economic growth and its important determinants. 
In contrast, both Kao test and four other tests of Pedroni, including panel PP, group PP, panel 
ADF, and group ADF reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level of 
significance as illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2: Results of Panel Co-integration Tests for All Countries  
Co-
integration 
Tests 
Kao Test 
Pedroni Test 
H1: Common AR Coefficients 
(within dimension) 
H1: Individual AR Coefficients 
(between dimension) 
Test Statistic ADF Panel v 
Panel 
rho 
Panel 
PP 
Panel 
ADF 
Group 
rho- 
Group 
PP- 
Group 
ADF- 
Intercept 
3.09777 
(0.010) 
-3.2097 
(0.9993) 
5.25878 
(1.000) 
-
5.0367 
(0.000) 
2.11037 
(0.0026) 
7.24033 
(1.000) 
-9.1885 
(0.000) 
1.82218 
(0.008) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using EViews.   
Note: P-values are given in parentheses. MAIC is used to determine the optimal number of lags to be 
included in the second stage regression. 
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According to the Monte Carlo simulation of Pedroni (Arellano and Bond 1991), the panel ADF 
and PP, as well as the group ADF and PP, are the most appropriate tests statistics for this model 
since they are working correctly in the case of the middle sample size as illustrated before. 
Therefore, we can regard the estimation model as being panel co-integrated. 
 
3.2.3 Panel Estimated Results  
In this section, the analysis run pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimations; to 
check the robustness of the results. Table 3 contains results of static panel data models from 
estimating the baseline growth model formalised in equation (1) for the whole sample and ACs 
samples. 
Based on the results in Tables 3, the overall F-statistics are significant in all panel data models, 
and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the explanatory variables do not 
explain (taken as a whole) changes in the dependent variable. Hence the determinants selected 
in this study can be considered to sufficiently explain changes in the real per capita GDP 
growth.  
Table 3: Estimated Panel Data Models for the Whole Sample  
Dependent Variable: The Growth rate of GDP per capita 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
lYY -0.36* 0.12 -1.02* 0.34 -0.36* 0.12 
M -0.31* 0.10 -0.45* 0.21 -0.31* 0.10 
E -0.11* 0.05 -0.18** 0.09 -0.11* 0.05 
B 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.16 0.20 
H -0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.21 
P 0.31* 0.10 1.05* 0.36 0.31* 0.10 
G -0.08 0.06 0.21 0.21 -0.08 0.06 
T -0.001 0.01 -0.004 0.01 -0.001 0.005 
Oil -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.01 -0.005 0.003 
pop -0.04 0.03 -0.11* 0.05 -0.04 0.03 
_cons 4.37* 1.04 10.55 3.05 4.37 1.04 
F test 0.0000 0.00000 
 
R-squared 0.1096 0.0717 0.0943 
chi2 
  
0.0000 
LM test, chi2 
  
0.76 
Hausman, chi2 
 
11.82 
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In Table 3, there is evidence of potential unobserved heterogeneity across countries owing to 
the insignificance of the estimated chi2 of the Lagrange Multiplier. Moreover, the OLS 
estimated standard errors are only valid when the errors are homoscedastic and not correlated 
(within individual countries) over time. As shown in Appendix 4 Table 4.1, it is clear that there 
is a weak correlation over time, which is very consistent with this result, indicating that there 
is probably no observed individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, the estimated robust standard 
errors are approximately similar to the standard OLS ones (see Appendix 4, Table 4.2) (Mátyás 
and Sevestre 2006).  Therefore, the pooled OLS regression will be the most appropriate results 
for the whole sample. 
The results in Table 4 show that the relationship between GDP per capita growth rates and its 
determinants is consistent with the theory. First, regarding the estimated coefficient of GDP 
per capita in the previous period, all samples are significant with negative signs except the oil-
rich economies in the sixth and seventh samples (RRLA & RRLI).  Consistently with the 
conditional convergence concept introduced by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), the 
convergence in the study model is conditional; it predicts higher growth in response to lower 
starting GDP per person only if the other explanatory variables (some of which are highly 
correlated with GDP per person) are held constant. For instance, in the world sample the 
estimated coefficient is −0.36 (s.e.=0.12), so the magnitude of the estimated coefficient implies 
that convergence occurs at the rate of about 36 percent per year. In other words, a one-standard-
deviation decline in the log of per capita GDP would raise the growth rate on impact by 0.36. 
This effect is very large in comparison with the other effects, that is, conditional convergence 
can have important influences on growth rates.  
   As a result of the positive relationship between stabilisation and growth, the signs of the 
coefficients as expected are all negative except for sample 6(RRLA). The strength of 
significant and negative stability coefficients supports the argument that the economy has the 
desired degree of macroeconomic stability that leads to the confidence of investors, incentives 
for the most productive destination of the inputs, and the accumulation of inputs feasible and 
profitable at reasonable rates of risks. In contrast, an economy marked by macroeconomic 
instability will present an excessive degree of uncertainty, which in turn will deter agents from 
investing or will cause them to make wrong decisions regarding the allocation of resources to 
alternative projects.  
   
Table 4: Estimated Panel Data Models for the Study Samples of Countries  
Dependent Variable: The Growth Rate of GDP per capita 
Independent 
variables 
(1) 
World Sample 
(Arab & Non-Arab) 
(2) 
Non- Arab Sample 
Arab Samples (Whole Arab Countries and Arab sub-groups) 
(3) 
Whole Arab Sample 
(4) 
LICS Sample 
(5) 
RPLA Sample 
(6) 
RRLA Sample 
(7) 
RRLI Sample 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
lyy -0.36* 0.12 -0.62* 0.16 -0.05* 0.20 -27.32* 24.21 -1.79* 0.84 0.37* 3.80 1.81* 2.64 
M -0.31* 0.10 -0.43* 0.13 -0.25* 0.21 0.79* 2.21 -0.29* 0.54 0.92* 1.38 -0.44* 0.63 
E -0.11* 0.05 -0.22* 0.06 0.02 0.09 -1.27* 1.35 -0.06* 0.36 -0.20* 0.76 -0.38* 0.45 
B 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.77 -5.86 4.38 -0.58 1.06 -1.62 3.54 1.04 2.15 
H -0.01 0.21 1.17* 0.55 -0.15* 0.24 2.33 6.05 -1.37 1.53 -0.42 4.66 -0.24* 0.32 
P 0.31* 0.10 0.46 0.14 0.25 0.21 5.14 7.63 0.90 0.59 -2.86 11.30 -1.27 2.27 
G -0.08 0.06 0.02* 0.07 -0.21* 0.18 -1.18* 1.96 -0.93* 0.58 -0.21 2.81 -1.07* 1.05 
T -0.001 0.01 -0.005 0.006 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.03 -0.01** 0.05 0.86* 0.90 -0.29* 0.18 
Oil -0.005 0.003 0.0002* 0.003 -0.004* 0.01 0.10 0.14 -0.04 0.02 -0.07* 0.13 -0.07* 0.04 
pop -0.04 0.03 -0.10* 0.08 -0.04* 0.04 -7.84* 6.15 -0.13 0.21 -1.52* 3.14 -0.13* 0.08 
_cons 4.37* 1.04 6.81 1.38 1.34 1.71 216.59 169.60 15.81 6.82 3.12 29.32 -11.45 25.40 
F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2-adj. 0.1096 0.2816 0.2836 0.9284 0.5050 0.5539 0.2835 
N. Countries 76 59 17 2 5 3 7 
*Denote significant at 5% level and **Denote significant at 10% level 
 
  
   Concerning the structural reforms (B) and physical infrastructure (P) variables, the 
coefficients of these factors are insignificant for all samples except where physical 
infrastructure is strongly significant and positive for the world sample. This could be because 
the nature of these indicators is associated with other indicators to improve the economic 
growth such as macroeconomic stability or external stability, by generating additional indirect 
benefits in the sense that services constitute an important intermediate input to downstream 
sectors such as manufacturing. According to Canton et al. (2014), reforms to labour markets 
that increase labour utilisation and boost output potential is vital to reducing structural 
unemployment, improving activity and employment rates, and boosting potential growth and 
welfare. On the other hand, another study by Mussa (1987) and Williamson (1994)  suggested 
that the efficiency of structural reforms depends on success in stabilising the economy. In other 
words, reforming the economy materialises into growth if applied in a stable macroeconomic 
environment. In an increasingly volatile environment, a high level of structural reforms 
increases the disruptive effect of macroeconomic instability. This means that structural reforms 
should take place at least at the same time as macroeconomic reforms, if not after. 
    However, the most striking result to emerge from the Table 4 is that the coefficients of 
human capital (H) and governance (G) indicators are statistically significant and positive for 
the non-Arab sample, they are statistically significant and negative for the Arab sample. This 
reflects the poor quality of human resources and governance in ACs and its effect on production 
output. This result is consistent with relative studies, for instance, regarding the bad condition 
of human capital and according to the last report from UNESCO (2014): the average adult 
literacy rate in the region only reached 72.9% in  2012. In addition, as Huebler and Lu (2015) 
prove that the evidence demonstrates that school systems in the region are generally of low 
quality. Necessary skills are not learned; most international standardised tests prove that the 
region is still below the expected level. 
Regarding the governance variable, it is significant but with a negative affect not only for Arab 
sample, but also for all sub-Arab groups, which is consistent with Ahmad and Marwan (2012); 
Hall et al. (2010); Jalilian et al. (2007); Nabli (2007)who confirms that institutional quality in 
ACs is very poor and faces many problems. That probably again explains the reasons for ‘Arab 
Spring’ in the region.  
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The coefficients of human capital, physical infrastructure and governance are complementary 
in understanding why the growth performance of the Arab region has been disappointing. Mo 
(2001) emphasises this relationship by linking corruption to low growth through reduced 
human and physical capital. He proves that, for private investors, corruption increases 
investment and operation costs, as well as uncertainties about the timing and effects of the 
application of government regulations. Corruption also raises the investment and operational 
costs of public enterprises, which are detrimental to private investment through inadequate and 
low-quality infrastructures (Tanzi and Davoodi 1998). The same conclusions have been 
reached for the effects of bureaucratic quality on the economic activity(Rauch and Evans 2000). 
   The last notable point in Table 4 is that, although ACs holds near to half of the global oil 
reserves, a quarter of natural gas reserves, and control almost a third of oil production, the 
coefficient of percentage of fuel exports to manufactured exports (O) is statistically significant 
with negative sign, in contrast to the non-Arab sample. This kind of relationship could explain 
the “resource curse” phenomena in the Arab region. That mean a negative growth and poor 
development outcomes are related to natural resources. The key reason for the slow growth is 
that ACs have failed to improve the performance of non-oil sectors (Selim and Zaki 2016). 
Large petroleum industry and high dependence on oil exports create unemployment and major 
social disparities and inequalities that fuel economic grievances leading to protest, insurgency, 
and civil war (Costello et al. 2015). 
  
 4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
    The main argument of this paper is there was a significant economic element to the Arab 
Spring, which relies mainly on the Arab economies failure to achieve sustained inclusive 
growth. Although ACs had implemented several economic and political reforms, it did not 
significantly affect the standards of living for Arab citizens. For instance, economically, the 
Arab region has the worst economic growth of GDP per capita. The regional GDP growth stays 
lower than the rest of the world regions. Also, the region exhibited highly skewed income and 
wealth accumulation as well as resource allocation. Politically, Arab nations are among the 
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worst performers in estimates of global corruption perceptions index. Consequently, in 2011 a 
wave of protests spread throughout most of the Arab region for economic and political rights. 
   To capture the origins of that situation, the study evaluated the impact of socioeconomic 
reforms on economic performance, by estimating an economic growth model for the Arab 
Region. The main aim is to understand the possible explanations for the Arab Spring: whether 
the growth performance of the region has been disappointing because ACs economies have 
lagged regarding reforms, or due to the reform programs themselves missing key components 
such as governance and quality of institutions. 
  The research model investigated most of the components of reform programs by generating 
aggregated reform indicators using principal component analysis. This method allows 
computing several variables into six separate groups to present the importance of economic 
reforms, human capital, physical infrastructure and governance to improve the growth 
prospects of the economies. These factors have been shown to have a powerful impact on 
growth. They have greatly contributed to the growth process in the study samples.  
The empirical results presented that, the Arab World’s economic performance in the past 20 
years has been below its potential. In addition, the ACs as a whole failed to generate high and 
sustained growth, did not reap the benefits of globalisation and the world economic integration, 
and were unsuccessful in dealing with persistently high unemployment rates. Breaking down 
Arab GDP growth into growth rate for country groups will disclose that only oil exporters show 
significant improvement (RRLI). Meanwhile, growth rates for other country groups have 
partially enhanced or remained flat-except in some countries in RPLA during the period 2005-
2010, such as Tunisia and Egypt. 
   The analysis shows, in general, economic stabilisation contributed positively to Arab region’s 
development except during high macroeconomic volatility in some years, especially after 
2010—which lead to disruptive growth. In addition, although most ACs implemented better 
macroeconomic policies, consolidating macroeconomic stability is still a priority for the 
success of structural reforms, as well as for successful competition with more successful 
developing countries. These results stress the importance of macroeconomic reforms for the 
growth prospects and the reform processes of the ACs. Macroeconomic stability remains 
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important for the government to address and reforming the economy should not be undertaken 
before stabilising. 
As for external stability, it has been identified as another factor affecting growth performances 
in ACs. The external instability of the 1990s strongly contributed to the economic turmoil of 
the period. In the 2000s, the renegotiation of the external debt assisted to improve the growth 
development in the region. The gap regarding external debt and the significant scope for debt 
reduction indicate, however, it still represents a potentially significant source of growth for the 
future. 
  The region is also concerned with achieving progress in structural reforms, which have always 
lagged behind faster-growing countries regarding forging investment, trade openness, and 
financial development. In the 1990s, the slow pace of these reforms limited the benefits of 
macroeconomic stabilisation. In fact, as illustrated by econometric results, attracting FDI, 
improving trade openness, and financial development would strongly contribute to the 
economic growth of ACs, in addition to facilitating the integration of the region into the world 
economy. However, more efforts are still needed to promote faster growth; governments should 
focus on simplifying the complex procedures for doing business and improving infrastructure. 
Financial sector reform, especially of state-owned banks, is also crucial to allocate resources 
to their most productive use and finance diversification. Many of these countries may have to 
readjust their overvalued exchange rates, which are undermining export competitiveness. 
Moreover, heightened uncertainty brought about by the introduction of reforms further deters 
the private sector from investing in an economic activity that does not yield immediate short-
term return. 
Furthermore, the empirical model confirms that the ACs resource rents have a negative effect 
on economic growth as well as governance. These results propose that the resource curse in the 
Arab world is primarily an “institutional curse”, even though it has several macroeconomic 
manifestations. The political conditions affect economics through how resource rents are 
collected, allocated and used. Explanations for the failure of the governments of various Arab 
states to provide the kind of sound governance for their populations that can deliver strong 
economic progress and meaningful upward mobility have tended to fall into one of three 
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categories: firstly, the implementation of misguided economic policies that provide 
government officials with an excessive amount of authority over the allocation of national 
resources; secondly , the presence of rampant corruption and cronyism throughout the organs 
of the state; and lastly the lack of accountability caused by a dearth of democracy and political 
freedoms.  
The effects of this misgovernance were so bad for all ACs in particular with no exceptions. For 
economies with little natural resource income relative to the size of their population (LICs and 
RPLA), the role of state control of major economic activities has been a key reason as to why 
resource-poor Arab nations have failed to keep pace with countries possessing more market-
oriented economic policies. On the other hand, weak governance in the abundant natural 
resource countries (RRLA and RRLI) have predated resource discovery and have had adverse 
implications for macroeconomic management. At the same time, natural resources have 
consolidated the weak institutional set-up. Over time, the interaction between these two factors 
became intertwined and prevented ACS from embarking on a sustainable development path.  
 Therefore, the analysis suggests that for ACs in general and resource-rich Arab countries 
(RRLI) to avoid the oil curse and achieve sustained growth and development, they must 
introduce effective political reforms. It is hoped that stronger political institutions will trigger 
reform in macroeconomic stability in general and in particular the structural reform that would 
improve the management of natural resources, achieve more savings, and implement more 
efficient private sector and public spending programs. The main challenge of these reforms is 
not only to make diversification in their economies but also to reorient their economies toward 
greater private-sector employment of nationals. 
Regarding the human capital impact, it is critical that ACs reduce inequality of opportunity and 
foster more inclusive growth. Working-age population growth in the region is higher than in 
all other developing regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, and according to World Bank (2016a), 
this rate will stay the same over the next decade. From this demographic perspective, it is 
imperative that labour market and other policy adjustments begin as soon as possible, and that 
there be a special emphasis on addressing shortcomings affecting youth.  
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Concerning labour market policies, policymakers in the region should move forward to remove 
supply-side restrictions, such as improving the quality of and implementing programs to better 
match labour force skills with those demanded by job markets. These efforts will need to be 
combined with the removal of constraints to competition and impediments to equality of 
opportunity among businesses. 
To conclude, according to the results of this study, reform is simultaneously political, social 
and economic. It is thus because real development is not only a question of employment, 
inflation and GDP growth. It also includes an incentive (profit), property rights (means of 
governance), resource allocation, and wealth distribution. The economic policy design that 
addresses these issues cannot ignore their political and social contexts and implications. 
Ignoring social implications will turn those who stand to reap the most benefits from reform 
into the enemies of reform. Therefore, there is a complementary relationship between 
socioeconomic reform and institutions. Political and economic reform should go together.
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Appendices 
Appendix. 1: List of Countries Included in the Analysis 
Arab 
Countries 
(ARB) 
Central & 
South Asia 
(CSA) 
 
East Asia 
(EAS) 
 
Europe 
(ECS) 
Latin 
America 
(LCN) 
North 
America 
(NAC) 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
(SSF) 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tunisia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
India 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Kazakhstan 
Russian 
Federation 
 
Australia 
China 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
Indonesia 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
New 
Zealand 
Singapore 
Thailand 
 
 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
México 
Perú 
Venezuela, 
RB 
Canada 
United 
States 
 
Angola 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Appendix. 2: List of the Regions Included in the Analysis, 1995 - 2014 
Region ode 
No. of 
Countries 
No. of Observations 
(1995 – 2014) 
ARB 17 340 
CSA 6 120 
EAS 9 180 
ECS 25 500 
LCN 10 200 
NAC 2 40 
SSF 7 140 
Total 76 1,520 
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Appendix 3: List of the Arab Sub-groups Included in the Analysis, 1995 – 2014 
 
Arab Sub-groups Names of Countries 
No. of 
Observations 
Low-income Countries 
(LICs) 
1. Sudan 
2. Yemen, Rep. 
40 
Resource-poor, 
Labour-abundant 
(RPLA) 
3. Egypt, Arab Rep. 
4. Jordan 
5. Lebanon 
6. Morocco 
7. Tunisia 
100 
Resource-rich, 
Labour-abundant 
RRLA 
8. Algeria 
9. Iraq 
10. Syrian Arab Republic 
60 
Resource-rich, 
Labour-importing 
RRLI 
11. Bahrain 
12. Kuwait 
13. Libya 
14. Oman 
15. Qatar 
16. Saudi Arabia 
17. United Arab Emirates 
140 
Total  340 
 
Appendix 4.1: The Correlation Coefficients of the OLS Residuals Over Time  
 
uols uols_1 uols_2 uols_3 uols_4 
uols 1 
    
L1. 0.1771 1 
   
L2. 0.0116 0.1539 1 
  
L3. -0.0623 0.0707 0.2719 1 
 
L4. -0.0062 -0.0608 0.2656 0.3486 1 
 
Appendix 4.2: The Robust of Standard Errors  
ly1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
lyy1 -0.33 0.10 -3.42 0.001 -0.52 -0.14 
M -0.38 0.11 -3.45 0.001 -0.60 -0.16 
E -0.12 0.05 -2.24 0.03 -0.22 -0.01 
B 0.06 0.08 0.8 0.428 -0.10 0.22 
H -0.28 0.09 -3.16 0.003 -0.45 -0.10 
P 0.50 0.14 3.67 0.001 0.22 0.77 
G -0.10 0.05 -1.85 0.071 -0.21 0.01 
T 0.01 0.01 1.06 0.294 -0.01 0.02 
Oil -0.01 0.00 -2.43 0.019 -0.01 0.00 
pop -0.06 0.05 -1.24 0.222 -0.15 0.04 
_cons 4.04 0.82 4.9 0 2.38 5.69 
 
